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Abstract: Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) are prone to emerging coexistence security threats such as Primary User 
Emulation Attack (PUEA). Specifically, a malicious CRN may mimic licensees’ (Primary Users (PUs)) signal characteristics to 
force another CRN to vacate its channels thinking that PUs have returned. While existing schemes are promising to some 
extent on detecting PUEAs, they are not able to prevent the attacks. In this article, we propose a PUEA Deterrent (PUED) 
algorithm that can provide PUEAs' commission details: offender CRNs and attacks’ time and bandwidth. There are many 
similarities between PUED and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) in terms of: deterrence strategy, reason for use, surveillance 
characteristics, surveillance outcome, and operation site. According to the criminology literature, robust CCTV systems have 
shown a significant reduction in visible offences (e.g. vehicle theft), reducing crime rates by 80%. Similarly, PUED will 
contribute the same effectiveness in deterring PUEAs. Furthermore, providing PUEAs’ details will prevent the network’s 
cognitive engine from considering the attacks as real PUs, consequently avoiding devising unreliable spectrum models for 
the attacked channels. Extensive simulations show the effectiveness of the PUED algorithm in terms of improving CRNs’ 
performance.  
 
Nomenclature 
 
1. Introduction 
The rapid proliferation of new wireless technologies 
and devices has led to increasing spectrum shortage. However, 
several studies have shown that a significant amount of 
licensed spectral bands are not utilised efficiently [1]. 
Cognitive Radio  technology was  proposed  to  exploit these 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  An example of three overlapping CRNs, where the 
Base Station of CRN2 has mimicked a PU signal to force 
CRN3 to evacuate one of its communication channels. 
 
spectral holes opportunistically [2]. In Cognitive Radio 
Networks (CRNs), unlicensed Secondary Users (SUs) with 
sensing capabilities strive to detect and share idle channels. 
However, once licensed Primary Users (PUs) return, 
these channels must be vacated and communication switched 
to other vacant channels [3]. 
 
1.1. PUEA: a security problem in CRNs 
 
Spectrum sensing is the key challenge in CRNs’ 
coexistence with PUs (incumbent-coexistence) and among 
themselves (self-coexistence) [4]. The last decade has seen 
the development of efficient sensing methods [5]-[7]. 
However, some vulnerabilities have opened an opportunity 
for attackers to defeat networks’ decision-making processes 
[8]. One of the most serious issues is known as Primary User 
Emulation Attack (PUEA) [9]. As depicted in Fig.1, PUEA 
can be committed by a malicious CRN by transmitting signals 
mimicking PUs’ characteristics to trigger another CRN to 
PUEA Primary User Emulation Attack 
PUED PUEA Deterrence Algorithm  
CogMnet Internetwork spectrum sharing  
𝐿  Number of locations in CogMnet 
𝐷𝐵𝑙   Database of a location 𝑙 (𝑙 ∈ 𝐿) 
𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵𝑙    Networks locations storage  
𝑅𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑙  Real-time storage 
𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑙  Historical storage 
𝑁  Number of CRNs (𝑛 ∈ 𝑁) 
𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥   
Represent a base station "𝑥" belongs to a 
network "𝑛" operates in a location "𝑙" 
𝑈  Number of utilising channels (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈) 
𝑆  
Number of channels that could be forced to 
release due by PUEAs 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠 and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠  Frequencies of the 𝑐ℎ𝑠 (𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) 
𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠 and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠 Utilisation starting times and dates of 𝑐ℎ𝑠 
𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖 and 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎 evacuation time and date of the 𝑆 channels  
𝐵 number of these overlapping cells 
𝐸  Number of the suspected channels  
𝐵𝑆𝑒  
Suspected base station sequence of the 
𝑐ℎ𝑒(𝑒 ∈ 𝐸) 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒   𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 Frequencies of the 𝑐ℎ𝑒 
𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑒 and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑒 Utilisation starting times and dates of 𝑐ℎ𝑒 
𝐴  Number of attack channels (A⊆ 𝑆) 
𝐵𝑆𝑎  Attacker base station sequence of the 𝑐ℎ𝑎 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎  and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎  Frequencies of the 𝑐ℎ𝑎 (𝑎 ∈ 𝐴). 
𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑎 and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑎 Attack starting times and dates of 𝑐ℎ𝑎 
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vacate its spectral bands. Over the past decade, the PUEA 
problem has received considerable attention [10]-[17]. The 
existing methods can be classified into two approaches: 
defence and detection. The defence based methods employ 
the game-theoretic algorithm to maximise the chance to 
‘escape’ from the attackers, such as Extra-sensing games [10], 
Surveillance Strategies [11], and multistage anti-jamming 
schemes [12]. However, these methods are not effective 
against a CRN performing several attacks on different 
channels simultaneously [13]. 
The detection based approach aims to verify whether 
the transmitter of the signal is the real PU or not [8]. The 
existing methods are categorised as: transmitter location 
verification and fingerprint verification. In the first type, 
several schemes based on Received Signal Strength have 
been proposed, such as [14] and [15]. Specifically, the 
attacker is identified by comparing the RSS with a predefined 
real PU signal. To identify PUEA via fingerprint verification, 
the authors in [16] have proposed a fingerprint check based 
phase shift difference, which is unique for each transmitter. 
Recently, to detect PUEAs, the authors in [17] presented an 
interesting study that uses cross layer intelligent learning by 
exploiting channel-tap power. Moreover, a signal activity 
pattern acquisition and reconstruction System was proposed 
in [13], which smartly distinguishes between the signal 
activity pattern of a real PU and a fake one. 
 
1.2. Motivation: Need for a deterrence method 
 
While the existing schemes are promising on detecting 
PUEA, they are not able to prevent CRNs from performing 
attacks. Furthermore, the offender network could pretend that 
the interference was committed unintentionally (i.e. 
misdetection of the occupier). Therefore, to implement a 
successful PUEA deterrence policy, we need to guarantee the 
following steps: 
 
1.2.1 Step 1: Preventing misdetection probabilities 
among CRNs. 
 
1.2.2 Step 2: Implementing an evidence-based 
algorithm that shows the commission of the PUEA. 
 
1.2.3 Step 3: Applying a self-coexistence system that 
punishes any CRN that may violate the coexistence rules. 
 
To achieve the first step, we proposed CogMnet 
framework in [18] to manage CRNs’ spectrum sharing by 
recording their utilisations in real-time databases. Thus, 
before starting to utilise any channel, CRNs must check their 
local database to verify whether another overlapping CRN is 
using the channels. Regarding the second step according to 
the criminology literature, identifying caller ID and Closed-
Circuit Television (CCTV) systems have had significant 
impacts in deterring nuisance calls and criminal activity 
respectively [19] [20]. This point has motivated us to propose 
an algorithm capable of determining PUEA commission 
details. For the last step, severe financial penalties played a 
significant role in decreasing reoffending rates [21]. As such, 
the regulator must release a self-coexistence system that 
punishes offenders for violating the rules. 
 
1.3. Contributions 
 
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a PUEA 
Deterrent (PUED) algorithm that could be implemented by 
any CRN after handing off any channel. PUED exploits 
CogMnet databases by the following mechanism: firstly, 
store the details of evacuated channels in a list called EVA list. 
Secondly, check the databases to determine the suspected 
channels which began to be utilised before vacating channels. 
These details will be recorded in a list known as SUS list. 
Thirdly, compare the files to determine similarities (i.e. 
PUEAs) and store the determined particulars in a file called 
ATCK list. Lastly, the ATCK list will be reported to Network 
administrator entity as proof of an attack. Furthermore, 
unlike existing schemes, PUED will forward PUEAs' details 
to the network's Cognitive Engine (CE) to avoid considering 
them as PUs activities, thus preventing the CE from devising 
unreliable models for the attacked channels. To the best of 
our knowledge, this action has been ignored by existing 
algorithms. We evaluate the impact of the PUED in CRNs 
with a simulator based on Vienna LTE-A Downlink System 
Level [22].  AAAAAAA Component of researchs 
 
1.4. Article structure 
 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. 
Section 2 is devoted to reviewing CogMnet and highlighting 
its spectrum management rules. In section 3 we formulate the 
research problem and present our system model. We describe 
the mechanism of PUED in Section 4. Section 5 is dedicated 
to clarifying real time sequences of PUED via a numerical 
example. Section 6 argues how PUED contributes to 
deterring PUEA commission by comparing the algorithm 
with other crime prevention methods. Section 7 presents 
simulation results for the PUED algorithm. Finally, we 
conclude the paper in Section 8. 
2. Overview of CogMnet 
2.1. Architecture 
 
To enable the reader to understand PUED, in this 
section, we clarify the main rules of CogMnet management. 
As illustrated in Fig. 2, CogMnet divides the whole area (i.e., 
a country) into 𝐿 locations and dedicates a real time database 
𝐷𝐵𝑙  in each location {𝑙 ∈ 𝐿}. The size of the locations must 
be assigned by the regulator, which may differ from one 
country to another (e.g. New York state is double the size of 
the UK and the UK is 21 times larger than Qatar) [23].  Each 
location 𝑙 may contain a different number of CRNs consisting 
of various cells. Each cell is coordinated by a single base 
station denoted as 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  where "𝑥" refers to the base station 
sequence in a CRN with sequence “𝑛" at the location “𝑙". 
Each database 𝐷𝐵𝑙  consists of three storage units to be used 
as follows: 
 
2.1.1 Networks Locations storage unit (𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵𝑙 ): 
Dedicated to recording CRNs specification in terms of  𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥 : 
a) Position (i.e. longitude 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥 and latitude 𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥 ); b) 
Status (active or not); c) Date of status 𝐷𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  (because CRNs 
are likely to stop due to expecting a saturated spectrum 
situation); and d) Communication Range (𝑅𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥 ). 
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Fig. 2 CogMnet architecture [18]. 
 
 
2.1.2 Real-Time storage unit (𝑅𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑙): Devoted to 
storing in a real-time the transmission parameters of CRNs’ 
channels. Thereby, each 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  sends the following: a) 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 
and 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; b) Utilisation date and time; c) Modulation and 
Coding scheme; and d) Transmission power. 
 
2.1.3 Historical Storage unit (𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑙): This unit is 
used to store the details of the vacated channels. Thus, each 
CRN must send the evacuation time and date of its released 
spectral bands. Accordingly, the specifications of the 
evacuated channels will be moved from the 𝑅𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑙 to 𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑙. 
 
It is important to mention that it is very important to 
preserve the privacy of the networks’ utilization. Therefore in 
the recording forms of each unit, the base stations have a 
sequence number that does not reflect to which network they 
may belong (will be exemplified in Section 6). 
 
2.2. CogMnet Management rules 
 
2.2.1 Mechanism of informing channels details: 
To ensure a reliable coexistence, the regulator will adopt a 
mechanism that obliges each CRN to send their transmission 
parameters correctly. Additionally, it must guarantee that the 
network will send the exact vacation time and period to their 
databases. This mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
2.2.2 Database inside network location: Each 
CRN can access its location’s database (i.e. storage units) in 
order to obtain information about the bands utilised by other 
networks. However, to preserve the privacy of the CRNs’ 
utilisation, the access to the storage units must be performed 
without revealing the identity of the networks. Therefore, 
each BS has a sequence number in the storage units that does 
not reflect to which network it may belong (will be 
exemplified in Section 5). 
 
2.2.3 Database outside network location: CRNs 
must be capable of utilising the databases of other locations 
in order to build a cognitive engine about other locations that 
the network may plan to extend to. However, in this case, 
each network must pay an extra fee which depends on the 
amount of information utilised, such as whether the channel 
is utilised in all or part of the location, or number of base 
stations. 
2.3. The objectives and advantages of CogMnet  
 
Undoubtedly, CogMnet will guarantee a number of 
benefits for both regulators and CRNs. Here, we summarise 
the key advantages of CogMnet. 
 
2.3.1 Spectrum misdetection avoidance: To avoid 
spectrum misdetection problems, CRNs need (before the 
sensing task) to check the Real Time storage unit for the 
spectrum bands currently utilised by the overlapping base 
stations.   
 
2.3.2 Avoiding Inter-Cell Interference: Exploiting 
the Real time storage in CogMnet, CRNs will be able to avoid 
reusing channels that are in use in the vicinity. 
 
2.3.3 Ability to Model SUs Activity: Exploiting the 
Historical storage in CogMnet, it will be easy for any CRN to 
model SUs’ activity (other coexisting CRNs). Knowing 
CRNs’ activities is very important to devise reliable models 
for spectrum behaviour and characteristics [24]. 
 
2.3.4 Candidate locations for CRNs: Any CRN 
will be able to analyse the utilisations in the Historical storage 
unit of non-overlapping base stations in order to make a list 
of candidate areas (both inside and outside network location). 
 
2.3.5 Protection for non-permitted channels: The 
regulators will guarantee that no CRN will utilise the non-
permitted channels (e.g. military channels). 
 
2.3.6 Sentences against the offending networks: 
knowing CRNs’ location and coverage area from the 
Networks Location storage unit will enable the regulator to 
punish any network that attempts to interfere with another one. 
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2.3.7 Assign number of CRNs in any location: 
Based on the suggested rules in CogMnet, the regulators will 
be capable of assigning the permitted number of CRNs in any 
location. 
 
2.3.8 Revenue for the regulators: Adminstrating 
and coordinating of CogMnet will guarantee a new income 
(paid by CRNs) for the regulators.   
3. Problem formulation 
We adopt the system model of CogMnet where a 
different number of infrastructure-based CRNs coexist in 
𝐿 locations. Let us suppose a base station 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  attempts to 
apply the algorithm.  
Basically, 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  is able to utilise a different number of 
channels for different numbers of users. For generality, let 𝑈 
be the number of utilised channels. Due to exploiting 
unlicensed channels, 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  must evacuate its channels once 
other activities are detected. Thus, we define 𝑉 as the number 
of the evacuated channels where 𝑉 ⊆ 𝑈. Actually, not all of 
𝑉  channels could be forced to release because of PUEA 
arrivals. Therefore, let 𝑆 be the number of the channels that 
need to be verified where 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑉 . Additionally, let 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠 
and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠 be the frequencies of the 𝑐ℎ𝑠 where 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. These 
channels have different utilisation starting times and dates 
which can be defined as 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠  and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠  respectively. 
However, they have the same evacuation time and date, 
which we represent as 𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖 and 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎. 
4. Mechanism of PUED Algorithm  
The PUED algorithm aims to show the commission of 
PUEA by offender networks. The algorithm is capable of 
providing complete information on PUEA commission. To 
do this, the algorithm exploits the information of overlapping 
CRNs’ utilisation in CogMnet databases. The mechanism of 
PUED is shown in Fig. 3, where the algorithm will create a 
number of lists as follows: 
 
Overlap list: Monitor 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵𝑙 in order to prepare a list 
consisting of information of overlapping cells (of other CRNs) 
with 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥  coverage area. Let 𝐼  is the number of available 
cells in the network location. Then, let 𝐾 denote the number 
of the overlapping cells with 𝐵𝑆𝑛,𝑙
𝑥 , where 𝐾 ⊆ 𝐼. Each cell 
will be identified by its base station sequence. 
 
 EVA list: This list is dedicated to storing the details of the 
evacuated channels that need to be checked from PUEA (i.e. 
𝑆 ). The information will be received from the Spectrum 
Decision Making component in the network's Cognitive 
Engine. The required details include the following: 
 
(i)  Frequencies: 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠 and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠 of each 𝑐ℎ𝑠 (𝑠 ∈ 𝑆). 
(ii) Utilisation period: The times and dates of both utilisation 
(𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠 and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠) and evacuation (𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖 and 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎) for the 𝑆 
channels. 
 
SUS list: In this stage, PUED will start checking 𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑙 to 
determine the suspected channels that are utilised by the 
overlapping CRNs (in Overlap list). According to CogMnet, 
if any CRN utilises any channel the network should send its 
under-utilised channels to 𝐷𝐵𝑙 . Thus, our algorithm proceeds 
to search the channels that are utilised by overlapping cells 
within the exploiting period of evacuated channels (i.e. 
between (𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠  and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠 ) and (𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖  and 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎 )). Let us 
denote the obtained channels as 𝐸. Thus the information of 𝐸 
channels will be stored in a new file known as SUS list 
(referring to ‘suspected’). The recorded details are as 
follows:- 
 
(i)  Base station sequence: Sequence base station number 
(𝐵𝑆𝑒) of each suspected 𝑐ℎ𝑒 where  𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 (each base station 
has a unique number assigned in 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵𝑙). 
(ii)  Frequencies:  𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒  and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒  of each 𝑐ℎ𝑒  (𝑒 ∈ 𝐸). 
Since PUEA could be performed on part of 𝑐ℎ𝑠, this means 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒  and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒  may not be the same as 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠  and 
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠. 
(iii) Utilisation: The exploitation times 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑒 and dates 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑒 
of each 𝑐ℎ𝑒. 
 
ATCK list: the PUEA identifier will compare both EVA list 
and SUS list to determine PUEAs. Let 𝐴 be the number of 
attacked channels and the specification of the determined 𝑐ℎ𝑒 
will be considered as 𝑐ℎ𝑎(𝑎 ∈ 𝐴). The specifications of 𝐴 
channels will be stored in a file known as ATCK list (referring 
to ‘Attack’). These specifications are as follows: 
 
(i) Attacker base stations: The sequence number of the 𝐵𝑆𝑎 
that are determined as PUEA committers. 
(ii) Evacuated channels frequencies (𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠 and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠). 
(iii) Attacking channels frequencies (𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎 and 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎). 
(iv) Utilisation and evacuated periods (i.e. (𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠, 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠) and 
(𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖, 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎)). 
(v)  Attack dates and times: 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑎 and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑎 of each 𝑐ℎ𝑎. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Mechanism of implementing PUED. 
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5. PUED in action 
5.1. Preliminaries to applying PUED 
 
To understand the procedure of determining PUEAs’ 
details, we give a numerical example for a CRN that attempts 
to implement PUED. We suppose that CRN1 in location 
number 2 attempts to apply PUED. Before describing the 
algorithm procedure, we need first to clarify the recording 
information forms in CogMnet databases. For instance, we 
exemplify in the Tables 1, 2 and 3 the recording forms in the 
storage units 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵2, 𝑅𝑇𝐷𝐵2 and 𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵2 . 
Note that the dates are defined as (day/month/year) 
and the times can be defined as (hours: minutes: seconds: 
parts of a second). As mentioned earlier, in order to preserve 
CRNs’ privacy, the identity of the network must not be 
revealed, and can only be seen by the regulator. Therefore, 
the green columns include what can be introduced by the 
CRNs, and each BS has a unique sequence number which 
does not reflect to which CRN it may belong. 
It is very important to mention that the specifications 
of the CRNs and their channels in this section do not represent 
any real data and are assumed only to explain PUED 
operation. 
 
5.2. Procedure and time sequence of PUED 
 
Turning now to the algorithm procedure, we suppose 
that CRN1 in location number 2 attempts to apply PUED. The 
procedure of implementing will be divided into four time 
processing sequences. Note the period of each time could be 
different and depends on processing information amount in 
each sequence. As depicted in Fig. 4, the sequences are as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Example of recording form in Networks Locations storage unit 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵2. 
 
CRN Base Station 
Base Station 
Sequence in 
CogMnet 
Longitude Latitude Status 
Date of 
status 
Communication 
Range 
1 1 1 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆1,41  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆1,41  Active 𝐷𝐵𝑆1,41  𝑅𝐵𝑆1,41  
2 1 2 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆2,41  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆2,41  Active 𝐷𝐵𝑆2,41  𝑅𝐵𝑆2,41  
3 1 3 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆3,41  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆3,41  Active 𝐷𝐵𝑆3,41  𝑅𝐵𝑆3,41  
4 
1 4 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆4,41  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆4,41  Active 𝐷𝐵𝑆4,41  𝑅𝐵𝑆4,41  
2 5 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆4,42  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆4,42  Inactive 𝐷𝐵𝑆4,42  𝑅𝐵𝑆4,42  
5 1 6 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆5,41  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆5,41  Active 𝐷𝐵𝑆5,41  𝑅𝐵𝑆5,41  
6 1 7 𝐿𝑜𝐵𝑆6,41  𝐿𝑎𝐵𝑆6,41  Active 𝐷𝐵𝑆6,41  𝑅𝐵𝑆6,41  
 
Table 2 Example of recording form in Real Time storage unit 𝑅𝑇𝐷𝐵2. 
 
CRN 
Base 
Station 
Base Station 
Sequence in 
CogMnet 
Channel (MHz) Utilisation MCS Max. 
Transmit 
power (watt) 𝒇𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒎𝒂𝒙 Time Date Modulation Code 
1 1 1 680 690 23:59:24:13 12/06/16 16 QAM 1/2 4 
3 1 4 2220 2225 23:59:32:26 12/06/16 QPSK 2/3 18 
2 1 3 1390 1400 00:00:41:35 13/06/16 BPSK 1/2 20 
3 2 5 550 558 00:01:01:27 13/06/16 64 QAM 5/6 4 
 
Table 3 Example of recording form in Historical storage unit 𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵4  (the channel (680-690) MHz is evacuated on 
13/06/16 at 00:19:42:34, and the channel (550-558) MHz is evacuated on 13/06/16 at 00:43:48:52). 
 
CRN 
Base 
Station 
Base 
Station 
Sequence 
in 
CogMnet 
Channel 
(MHz) 
Utilisation Evacuation MCS Max. 
Transmit 
power 
(watt) 𝒇𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒎𝒂𝒙 Time Date Time Date Modulation Code 
1 1 1 680 690 23:59:24:13 12/06/16 00:19:42:34 13/06/16 QPSK 2/3 4 
3 2 5 550 558 00:01:01:27 13/06/16 00:43:48:52 13/06/16 64 QAM 5/6 4 
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5.2.1 Sequence one: Here, PUED perform two 
tasks in parallel Overlap list and EVA list. Firstly, for 
Overlap list, we assume that our network has identified 
(from𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵2) the network coexists with seven cells (i.e. 𝐼=7) 
belonging to a number of CRNs. However, usually, not all 
these cells are overlapping with each other. Let us assume the 
PUED has obtained in this level five cells (i.e. 𝐾 =5) 
overlapping as follows: 𝐵𝑆2, 𝐵𝑆3, 𝐵𝑆4, 𝐵𝑆6,  and 𝐵𝑆7 . 
Secondly, in the same time PUED will get the information of 
the EVA list from spectrum decision making component. Let 
us assume our network has evacuated seven channels (𝑉 = 7) 
and five of them (𝑆 = 5) need to be verified.  Therefore, we 
assume the EVA list to be as in Table 4, where the channels 
have started to be utilised since 23:56:24:41 (=  𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠 ) on 
21/07/16 (=𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠) respectively until 00:02:32:10 (= 𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖) on 
22/07/16 (=𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎). 
 
5.2.2 Sequence two: Accordingly, the algorithm in 
this level will check 𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵2  for suspected channels utilised 
between (𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠,𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠) and (𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖,𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎) to determine the SUS 
list. Let us assume PUED determined six suspected channels 
(𝐸=6) in the SUS list as in Table 5. 
 
5.2.3 Sequence three: In this level, the PUEA 
identifier component will start to perform comparison steps 
between both EVA list and SUS list to determine ATCK list 
which can be as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Sequence time processing of the PUED algorithm. 
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(i) Frequencies Comparison Stage: PUED proceeds to 
compare the frequencies of each channel from the EVA list 
with the channels of the SUS list. It is important to note that 
the attack could be performed either in the whole or part of 
the channel. Specifically, an entire band attack was 
committed by 𝐵𝑆3 in the channel (660-668 MHz), while part 
band interference was committed on the channels (2240-2250 
MHz) and (1310-1320 MHz), where 𝐵𝑆4  and 𝐵𝑆7  have 
attacked in the bands (2245-2250 MHz) and (1310-1318 
MHz) respectively. 
(ii) Time Comparison Stage: In this step, the algorithm will 
verify the time of the above-identified channels. For instance, 
the band (660-668 MHz) was attacked by 𝐵𝑆3  at 
(00:01:58:24) on (22/07/16). Additionally, the partial attacks 
on the channels (2240-2250 MHz) and (1310-1320 MHz) 
occurred at (00:02:17:35) on (22/07/16) and at (00:02:19:23) 
on (22/07/16) respectively. Accordingly, the details of the 
attacks are recorded in the ATCK list as illustrated in Table 6. 
 
5.3. Outcome of PUED 
 
5.3.1 Network's administrator entity: a copy of the 
list will be sent to this entity in order to use it as evidence 
against the offender CRNs. Therefore, the list will be 
provided to the regulator. The regulator will then determine 
the identity of offender CRN(s) from 𝑁𝐿𝐷𝐵2 and take 
appropriate action based on self-coexistence rules. Note that 
this step is very important to achieve our aim, which is to 
deter PUEA rather than merely detecting it. 
 
5.3.2 Network’s cognitive engine: A Cognitive 
Engine (CE) is an intelligent agent that facilitates situation 
awareness, adaptation, reasoning, learning, and planning [25]. 
Therefore, to avoid considering the PUEAs as real PUs 
activities, PUED periodically reports ATCK list to the CE. As 
a consequence, this will prevent devising unreliable models 
for the attacked channels. Finally, a pseudo code description 
of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 5. 
Table 4 EVA list of six evacuated channels need to be verified from any PUEA. 
 
Channel No. 
Evacuated channel  Utilising Evacuation 
𝒇𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒎𝒂𝒙 Date Time Date Time 
1 660 668 
21/07/16 23:56:24:41 22/07/16 00:02:32:10 
2 760 770 
3 2240 2250 
4 1310 1320 
5 1835 1845 
 
Table 5 SUS list determined from 𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐵2 . 
 
Channel No. Base Station 
Suspected channel  Utilisation 
𝒇𝒎𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒎𝒂𝒙 Date Time 
1 4 682 690 21/07/16 23:59:19:12 
2 3 660 668 22/07/16 00:01:58:24 
3 2 1460 1465 22/07/16 00:02:02:17 
4 4 2240 2245 22/07/16 00:02:17:35 
5 7 1310 1320 22/07/16 00:02:19:23 
6 6 810 820 22/07/16 00:02:24:31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 ATCK list. 
Channel 
No. 
Attacker 
Base 
Station 
Evacuated 
channel 
Attack 
channel 
Utilising Evacuating Attack 
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 Date Time Date Time Date Time 
1 3 660 668 660 668 21/07/16 23:56:24:41 
22/07/16 00:02:32:10 
22/07/16 00:01:58:24 
2 4 2240 2250 2245 2250 22/07/16 00:00:41:37 22/07/16 00:02:17:35 
3 7 1310 1320 1310 1318 22/07/16 00:00:41:37 22/07/16 00:02:19:23 
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5.4. Complexity of PUED  
 
Before leaving this section, it is important to mention 
that PUED can be implemented meanwhile the network is 
continuing its normal operation. However, we need to study 
the complexity of this algorithm. In computer science, a 
mathematical notation called ‘Big O’ is used to classify 
algorithms according to how their running time or space 
requirements grow as the input size grows [26]. Independent 
of any particular program or computer, it is important to 
quantify the number of operations or steps that our algorithm 
will require. First, we need to determine how long the 
algorithm takes, in terms of the size of its input. As clarified 
in the last subsection, PUED will consume three time 
sequences. Therefore our machine equation will consist of 
three terms. According to the Big O notation description: 
 
(i)   The first time sequence is 𝐼 which refers the number of 
repetitions to find 𝐾 for the Overlap list.  
(ii) The second time sequence is 7𝐸 , where 7 represents one 
statement for comparing 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠, 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎 and six for 
recording the items in the SUS list (i.e. 𝐵𝑆𝑒 , 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥e, 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛e, 
𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑒, and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠). 
(iii) The last term is 12𝐸(𝑆 − 𝐴), where 12 represents the 
recorded items in the ATCK list (i.e. 𝐵𝑆𝑎 , 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒 , 
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 , 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠 , 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠 , 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠 , 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠 , 𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖 , 𝑒𝑣𝑑𝑎 ,  𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑒 , 
and 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠). Additionally, 𝐸(𝑆 − 𝐴) represents the number of 
iterations. (because when any channel is identified then its 
specification will be removed from the comparisons i.e. the 
number of iteration will be reduced form 𝐸𝑆  to 𝐸(𝑆 − 𝐴 ) 
times). 
 
Since PUED aims to deter the number of attacks 
(i.e. 𝐴), then, as 𝐴 becomes less and as 𝐸 and 𝑆 get larger, 𝐴 
will become less significant to the final result. Therefore, 
when looking for an approximation for 12𝐸(𝑆 − 𝐴), we can 
drop 𝐴 and simply say the running time is 12𝐸𝑆. Accordingly, 
our algorithm can be represented by 𝐾 + 7𝐸 + 12𝐸𝑆 . 
Therefore the Big O notation that would describe PUED is 
𝑂(𝐾𝐸𝑆). 
6. How PUED prevents PUEAs 
Below, we will argue that the PUED algorithm will 
lead to deterring PUEAs. However, we first need to introduce 
the main crime prevention methods. 
 
6.1. Crime prevention methods 
 
According to the offence deterrence literature, there 
are two different crime prevention strategies [27]: 
 
6.1.1 Primary crime prevention: Concerns the 
offence rather than the offender and is related to certain 
methods of localising the context of the criminality. 
Examples of this strategy are: 1) Caller ID Screening (to 
show the numbers of nuisance calls); 2) CCTV surveillance 
  
Algorithm: PUED algorithm 
1:   Create EVA list  
2:   Create  SUS list  
3:   Create ATCK  list  
4:   Let 𝑎 = 0                     % counter for the attack channels % 
5:   for  e = 1 to 𝐸 do         % counter for the suspected channels % 
6:         for  s = 1 to 𝑆 do   % counter for the under-verifying channels % 
7:                if  (𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 ≤ 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠 Λ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒 ≥ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠) Λ (𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑒 = 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠) Λ (𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑒 ≤ 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠 ≤  𝑒𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑒)  
8:                       then PUEA is verified in 𝑐ℎ𝑠; 
9:                        𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠;  𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎 = 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠; 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑎 = 𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠; 𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑎= 𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑠; and 𝐵𝑆𝑎 = 𝐵𝑆s; 
10:                        𝑎 = 𝑎 +  1; 
11:                        update 𝑨𝑻𝑪𝑲 𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒕 ⟵ 𝑐ℎ𝑎; 
12:                        Remove 𝑐ℎ𝑠 from SUS list 
13:                 end if 
14:           end for 
15:     end for 
16:     if  𝑎 ≥ 1 then Output  𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐾 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 to 1) Network's Administrator Entity     
17:                                                                2) Cognitive Engine  
18:          else Output  “ No PUEA ”  
 
 
Fig. 5 Pseudo code of the PUED algorithm. 
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(to take images of offences taking place); and 3) Financial 
Penalties (to emphasise the severity of punishment). 
 
6.1.2 Secondary crime prevention: focuses on 
offenders rather than offence and seeks to prevent them from 
reoffending in the future: for example, centres for Prisoner 
Health and Human Rights, and Programs of Rehabilitation. 
 
It is clear that PUED falls into the first type of crime 
strategies. Particularly, there are many similarities between 
our algorithm and CCTV systems. Therefore, in the next sub-
section we will discuss this in detail. 
 
6.2. PUED as a CCTV surveillance system 
 
To understand which CCTV systems and which crime 
types are similar to PUED, we need to investigate CCTV 
systems.  In the relevant literature, these systems can be 
classified according to [19]: 
 
(i) Surveillance location: Refers to whether it is used for 
government business or personal.   
(ii)  Reasons for their use: Firstly, criminal reasons (e.g. 
robbery, assault, criminal damage, endangering life, and 
vehicle theft). Secondly, non-criminal reasons (e.g. 
Employee training and education, part of emergency and 
disaster plan). 
(iii) Operation site: Indicates whether the surveillance is in an 
open or closed area. 
(iv) Surveillance characteristics: Firstly, technical types (e.g. 
Day/Night, Infrared/vision, and C-mount). Secondly, 
technical Network connection (e.g. Network/IP, wireless). 
Thirdly, viewshed (e.g. movement detection). 
 
Therefore, PUED operation is very similar to the 
CCTV surveillance of visible crime in closed areas for the 
following reasons:  
 
(i) Reason for use: to determine PUEA commission, the 
PUED uses details similar to CCTV crime surveillance. 
(ii)  Operation site: since CogMnet has divided the country 
into specific size locations, thus it is similar to a CCTV 
system for crimes in closed areas.  
(ii) Clearly observable offence: because all network 
utilisations are recorded in the databases and can be observed 
clearly by the CRNs. The best example of clearly visible 
crime is vehicle theft because other visible robberies cannot 
be as completely visible as vehicle theft at the point of 
commission. Therefore, we could now infer that our 
algoirthm outcome is expected to be like the CCTV systems 
for vehicle theft. 
According to criminology writers, robust CCTV 
systems have shown a significant reduction in vehicle theft. 
As summarised in Table 7, to choose an appropriate sample, 
we compare PUED with a recent study of CCTV surveillance 
conducted at three selected sites in Cincinnati, OH (small 
neighbourhood, apartment complexes, and multi-unit 
residential structures) [20]. For a one-year period evaluation 
(2012-2013) three-dimensional spatial analysis was used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the CCTV system. The 
evaluation was conducted for the following crimes: robbery, 
assault, criminal damaging, endangering, and vehicle theft.  
The system can provide images of offences taking place, 
which is similar to our algorithm that can obtain the PUEA 
commission details. The study has shown a significant 
prevention of vehicle theft, reducing stealing rates by 80%. 
Consequently, we believe that PUED will achieve the same 
degree of improvement and deter 80% of PUEA. 
It is of great importance to mention that CogMnet 
must enforce rules for the self-coexistence system that punish 
aggressive CRNs that may violate the rules. According to 
criminology writers, numerous studies have observed that 
financial penalties played a significant role in reducing crime 
and reoffending rates [21]. Hence, the deterrence rate of 
PUED can be increased further by severe financial fines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Comparison between PUED and CCTVs Surveillance in [20]. 
 
Merit CCTV surveillance PUED algorithm  Similarity 
Deterrence strategy Primary crime prevention  Primary crime prevention  √ 
Reasons for its use 
To prevent crime and provide increased 
safety. 
To deter PUEA and provide reliable security 
coexistence.   
√ 
Surveillance outcome 
Shows the offender(s) committing the 
offence.   
Shows how the CRN(s) are committing the 
PUEA. 
√ 
Operation site Selected cities with specified size. Specified location size assigned by CogMnet. √ 
Surveillance 
characteristics 
Monitors approximately 1000ft from the 
camera at maximum; additionally, it can 
identify license plate numbers within a 
300ft range and recognise objects and 
colour within a 1000ft. 
Coverage of all utilisation by the existing and 
newly admitted CRNs from the databases  
√ 
Surveillance period Provides 24/7 surveillance. 24 Hours a Day. √ 
Vandalism possibility Yes No X 
Continuous maintena
nce 
Required Not needed X 
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7. Performance Evaluation 
7.1. CRNs Reliability under PUEAs 
 In this subsection, we evaluate the network 
performance of the PUED using MATLAB R2016b (Version 
9.1.0.441655). We investigate the influence of PUEA on the 
performance of SUs in terms of the Dropping ( 𝑅𝐷 ) and 
Blocking (𝑅𝐵) rates [28]: 
 
𝑅𝐷 = ∑ (𝜆𝑃𝑈𝑠𝑃(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧)+
(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧)∈Ω
𝑃(𝑚𝑑+𝑃𝑈𝐸𝐴)𝜆𝑃𝑈𝐸𝐴𝑃(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧) 
(1) 
𝑅𝐵= ∑ 𝜆𝑆𝑈𝑠𝑃(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧)
(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧)∈Ω
 
(2) 
 
Where 𝑥 and 𝑦 represent the sum of PUs and PUEAs, 
and 𝑧 denotes the number of SUs. Additionally, 𝜆𝑃𝑈𝑠, 𝜆𝑃𝑈𝐸𝐴𝑠 
and 𝜆𝑆𝑈𝑠  are arrival rates of PUs, PUEAs and SUs 
respectively. In the equations 𝑃(𝑚𝑑+𝑃𝑈𝐸𝐴)  represents 
probabilities of missing detection and PUEAs. According to 
CogMnet, 𝑃𝑚𝑑  will be neglected because each CRN will 
verify its channels from 𝑅𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑙  before utilising them. Lastly, 
𝑃(𝑥,𝑦,𝑧)  is the steady state probability and Ω  is state 
aggregation. 
Turning now to the experimental assumptions, we 
assume that there are ten available channels, where a PU can 
only take one channel. As summarised in Table 8, we adopt 
the arrival rates 𝜆𝑃𝑈𝑠 , 𝜆𝑃𝑈𝐸𝐴𝑠  and 𝜆𝑆𝑈𝑠 , following Poisson 
process and assuming 𝜆𝑃𝑈𝑠  and 𝜆𝑆𝑈𝑠   as 0.2 and 0.1 
respectively. When a PU arrives, SU will be dropped if the 
channels are all occupied or handed-off into a new idle 
channel. We assume the service times of both PUs and SUs 
follow exponential distribution with service rates of 0.4 and 
0.2 respectively. Similarly, the service rate of PUEAs is 
assumed as 0.7. Lastly, in the experiments 𝑃(𝑚𝑑+𝑃𝑈𝐸𝐴)  is 
taken as 0.2. 
In Fig. 6(a and b), we evaluated SUs’ dropping and 
blocking rates according to different PUEAs arrival rates.  
Clearly, both figures show that dropping and blocking rates 
become higher as PUEA arrival rates increase, thus reducing 
the quality of service of SUs. In other words, reduction of 
dropping and blocking rates causes a decrease in attack 
arrival rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2. PUED Impact on CRNs Performance 
 
In this subsection, we evaluate PUED by conducting 
simulations of an infrastructure-based CRN based on Vienna 
LTE-A Downlink System Level [22]. Table 9 presents the 
key CRN parameters used in our simulations. We assumed 
our network to consist of a single site with a BS using an 
omnidirectional antenna allocated at the site centre with 25 m 
height. The coverage radius equals 500m, and CLSM 
discipline is applied. For simplicity, we assumed that the 
seven available channels have the same bandwidth value: 1.4 
MHz.  A variable number of SUs is assumed, which are 
uniformly distributed inside the cell. We evaluated the 
network in three scenarios: 
 
(i)    Five PUEAs: here, PUEAs are present in five channels. 
(ii) PUED Algorithm: in this scenario, we apply our 
algorithm. 
(iii)  No PUEAs: represents no PUEA in the channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Experimental assumptions. 
 
Factors Assigned value 
Available channels    10 
PUs arrival rate 0.2 
Follow Poisson process 
SUs arrival rate 0.1 
PUs services rate 0.4 
Follow exponential distribution 
SUs services rate 0.2 
PUEAs arrival rate  Variable  
PUEAs services rate    0.7 
 
-a- 
 
 
-b- 
 
Fig. 6.  CRNs Reliability under different PUEAs arrival 
rates. 
(a) SUs dropping rate. 
(b) SUs blocking rate. 
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Fig. 7(a) shows the average of the allocated Resource 
Blocks (RBs) of each SU in the three scenarios. Firstly, 
regardless of how many SUs are in the CRN, the allocated 
RBs in the Five PUEAs case would decrease substantially 
compared with No PUEAs. One can observe from the figure 
that by applying our algorithm, the RBs of each user have 
increased significantly. Obviously, as the number of SUs 
increases, there is a significant decrease in amount of RBs per 
SU (Note that the round robin scheduler method is formulated 
in such a way that it shows the same number of RBs for each 
end user).  Consequently, the transmission rate of each user 
will be greatly reduced. 
Therefore, we evaluate in Fig. 7(b) the average 
throughput of SUs in the three cases. It can be seen that the 
presence of PUED has reached the average data rates of the 
No PUEAs scenario. Additionally, it shows a significant 
improvement compared to the Five PUEAs case. The 
throughput degradation (in all cases) increases as the number 
of SUs increases as a consequence of reducing the number of 
RBs. In Fig. 7(c), we compare the network throughput in all 
scenarios. One can clearly see that the PUED Algorithm 
scenario has led to a leap in the overall CRN throughput, thus 
improving the quality of service of the network. 
8. Conclusion  
In this chapter, a PUEA deterrent algorithm, namely PUED, 
has been proposed. PUED enables CRNs to determine the 
offender network and attacks’ details. Like eye witness crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 prevention schemes, particularly CCTV surveillance, the 
PUED report’s ATCK list contains the full details about the 
offender CRN(s) to be used as evidence against the adversary 
CRNs. We believe that PUED will contribute to the 
prevention of PUEAs in the same way as CCTV deters crimes. 
Additionally, another important role for PUED is improving 
CRNs’ ability to devise reliable models for the attacked 
channels to avoid considering PUEAs as real PU activities. 
We, therefore, conclude this paper with two remarks: 
Table 9 Simulation Parameter Settings. 
 
Model parameter Value 
Channel type Downlink 
Tx Power 40 W 
Tx antenna gain 15 dB 
Rx antenna gain 0 dB 
Rx beamwidth Omni-directional 
Number of channels 7 
Bandwidth 1.4 MHz 
Antenna type CLSM 2x2 MIMO 
Tx antenna height 25 m 
Rx antenna height 1.5 m 
Polarisation Vertical 
Modulation Adaptive (QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM) 
Scheduler Round Robin 
SUs mobility 3 km/h (Pedestrian) 
Number of SUs Variable to test 
Area of study 1 km2 
Noise figure 8 dB 
Traffic model Full buffer 
 
 
-a-
 
 
-b-
 
-c- 
 
Fig. 7.  PUED evaluation. 
(a) Average number of RBs per SU. 
(b) Average throughput per SUs. 
(c) Overall network throughput. 
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(i)  PUED in all CRNs: It is necessary to incorporate PUED 
in CRNs design. 
(ii) Official adoption of CogMnet: In this article, we have 
emphasised the importance of CogMnet in achieving a 
reliable, secure self-coexistence among infrastructure-based 
CRN types. 
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